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TAXATION - FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCEEFFECT OF TREASURY DECISION 5032 1 AMENDING ARTICLES 25 AND
27 OF THE EsTATE TAx REGULATIONS - First enacted in 1918, the
provision of the Internal Revenue Code providing for the estate taxation of life insurance proceeds has remained unchanged to date:
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside of the United States ...
"(g) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor
as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own
life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies
taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
The number of this section has been changed from time to time,2
but it will hereinafter be referred to as section 8 II (g). This language
is simple and unambiguous except for the one phrase-"taken out by
the decedent." It is impossible to ascribe with certainty any one meaning to this phrase. To the layman it would probably mean "applied for
and issued to." But this would be too restricted a definition from the
standpoint of tax administration. From the tax authorities' point of
view there are only two significant factors in regard to any insurance
policy-payment of premiums and control over the policy. The first is

1 1941:1 CuM. BuLL. 427, approved January 10, 1941, now incorporated in
TREAS. REG. 105 (1942), §§ 81.25, 81.27. For a thorough analysis of problems arising
before the case of Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 617, rehearing
(Ct. Cl. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 184, second rehearing (Ct. Cl. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 778,
see I PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G1FT TAXATION, c. IO (1942); Smith, "Federal
Taxation of Insurance Trusts," 40 M1cH. L. REv. 207 ( I 941); Paul, "Life Insurance
and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L. REv. 1037 (1939); Fraenkel, "Federal
Taxation of Life Insurance Policies," 5 BROOK. L. REv. 140 ( I 936) ; Oppenheimer,
"Proceeds of Life Insurance Policies under the Federal Estate Tax," 43 HARV. L. REv.
724 (1930).
2 40 Stat. L. 1097, § 402 (f) (1919); 42 Stat. L. 278, § 402 (f) (1921); 43
Stat. L. 304, § 302 (g) (1924); 44 Stat. L. 70, § 302 (g) (1926); 53 Stat. L. 120
(1939), § 8II (g), 26 u. s. C. (1940), § 8II (g).
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a simple, definite and easily pr_oven fact, while the second is an intangibLe and shadowy question of degree.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue from the first defined
"taken out" as meaning "having paid the premiums," and until 1930 3
the Estate Tax Regulations stood steadfastly by premium payment as
the sole criterion of taxability. Meanwhile, however, the federal courts
had indicated that when the decedent, prior to death, assigned all incidents of ownership and control over the policy to another, he retained
no property interest in the policy wh~ch could be deemed to pass on his
death, and therefore, under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, no event taxable to the decedent existed as to the proceeds of
such policy.4 It was not until an amendment of Article 25 on March
18, 1937, that the Estate Tax Regulations were revised to conform with the tenor of the courts' decisions by clearly indicatins- that
policies would not be taxed unless some incident of ownership was
retained by the decedent. 5
The commissioner, unsatisfied with such limitation, recently utilized
one Bailey as a means for a test case to serve as the basis for a proposed
amendment to the regulations. Disregarding the clear language of the
regulations, the commissioner resisted Bailey's suit for refund of an
estate tax paid on the proceeds of a policy the ownership of which had
been assigned by the decedent prior to his death. The Court of Claims,
in Bailey v. United States,6 without reference to the then applicable
regulations, sustained taxability on the grpund that the continued payT. D. 4296, 9:2 CuM. BuLL. 427 ( 1930).
Paul, "Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L. REv. 1037
(1939). Lang v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 304 U.S. 264, 58 S. Ct. 880
(1938), might be cited to modify this statement. There decedent retained a p6wer
to change the beneficiaries but under the local law of community property had no
right to do so. The court approved the then subsisting Treasury Regulations, wl).ich
provided for taxability of insurance proceeds to the estate of the insured on the basis
of premium payments and without regard to retention .of incidents of ownership by the
insured. However, the force of this opinion as authority for the proposition that incidents of ownership need not be retained in order to tax proceeds to the insured's
estate is weakened by the fact that it did not affirmatively appear that other incidents
of ownership were not held by decedent. Also, the question of the constitutionality
of taxing in the absence of such retention was not even raised by counsel. The entire
argument was directed to whether one-half only or the entire proceeds should be included in view of the community property doctrine.
5 TREAS. REG. 80 (1937 ed.), art. 25. Seel PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G1FT
TAXATION 512-514 (1942).
6 (Ct. Cl. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 617. The opinion contained this analysis: The
estate tax provisions of the taxing act specifically prpvided without exception for the
inclusion in the gross estate of such insurance as in question. All prior Supreme Court
decisions requiring a retention of legal incidents of ownership are distinguishable
because they referred to policies taken out prior to the Revenue Act of 1918. As to
policies taken out after said Revenue Act, assignment of legal incidents is immaterial
because the insured was on notice when he took out policies that they would be taxable.
3

4
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ment of premiums by decedent after the assignment, coupled with the
death of the decedent, wer_e necessary events to the full culmination of
insurance benefits, and in the light of the inherently testamentary character of insurance were sufficient to provide taxability to decedent's
estate.
This first Bailey decision was reversed on a rehearing when new
evidence revealed that the assignee paid all the premiums after assignment, but the first decision was reaffirmed as to facts found therein. 7
The commissioner interpreted the Bailey case as not merely eliminating the retention of legal incidents in decedent as a prerequisite to
taxability, but also as providing that payment of premiums by decedent
at any time is ground for including the insurance proceeds in the gross
estate. This concept was the basis for the amendment to the regulations
embodied in Treasury Decision 5032.
Before entering into a detailed analysis thereof, two preliminary
questions should be discussed. First, was payment of premiums necessary before the Bailey case to sustain taxability, or was retention of legal
incidents the sole test? In almost all of the reported cases either
premium payments were made by the insured decedent or the question
was not raised, but there was at least one decision by the Board of Tax
Appeals holding the proceeds taxable to the decedent where none of the
premiums were paid by her. 8 The third decision of the Bailey case 9
also indicates that premium payments were unnecessary to support
taxation. While the second decision held the policy exempt when it
was shown that the assignee paid all premiums after assignment, the
decision was reversed when it was further shown that decedent did
retain a legal incident.10
7 Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 184. These two opinions
by the same court are seemingly reconcilable only on the theory that in so far as payment of premiums is the basis of taxing proceeds to decedent, he must continue to pay
the premiu,ms until his death. That such was the theory adopted by the court is corroborated by the following expression in the first opinion, 27 F. Supp. 617 at 622:
''We think Congress in section 302(g) and (h) of the Revenue Acts of 1924 and
1926 and subsequent acts has clearly expressed an intention to include the proceeds of
life-insurance policies thereafter taken out by the decedent upon his own_life notwithstanding an assignment by him of his right to receive the cash-surrender value or to
change the beneficiary, especially where he continues after such auigwment to pay the
premiums upon the policies." (Italics supplied.) Thus, although the court did not expressly say that such continued payment is essential to taxability, it indicated that this
is an important factor in sustaining taxability.
8 John Bromley, Exr., 16 B. T. f,,.. 1322 (1929).
9 Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 778.
10 Under Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940), it appeared for the first time that such retention of a possibility of reverter was a sufficient
interest in decedent to make the proceeds subject to the estate tax. See Ray, "The Estate
Tax on Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at or after
Death: Helvering v. Hallock," 29 GEo. L. J. 943 (1941).
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Second, if a decision such as the Bailey case could be reached under
the existing regulations, why did the commissioner think it necessary
to amend the regulations? A complete answer would require an extended discussion of the interrelation of statutes, regulations, and court
decisions, beyond the scope of this article. 11 In short, however, the
answer appears to lie mainly in the established policy of not applying
new statutory interpretations retroactively to the prejudice of those
relying on inconsistent regulations. It is clear that the regulations prior
to T. D. 5032 were not consistent with the decision of the Bailey case.
While there is apparently no doctrine of estoppel to prevent the commissioner from seeking in the courts a decision contrary to existing regulations, it would obviously be bad tax administration to retain such
regulations unaltered w.hen he is successful.
Article 25 of the Estate Tax Regulations as amended by T. D. 5032
now provides:
" ... Insurance~ .. is considered to have been taken out by the
decedent where he paid, either directly or indirectly, all the premiums or other consideration wherewith the insurance was acquired,
whether or not he made the application. Such insurance is not considered to have been so taken out, even though the application was
made by the decedent, if no part of the premiums or other consideration was paid either directly or indirectly by him." 12
Previously the regulations defined policies as taken out by the decedent "if he acquired the ownership of, or any legal incident thereof
in, the policy." 18 Does this change in language indicate that the commissioner h.as abandoned the ownership of legal incidents as a positive
basis for the inclusion of insurance proceeds? Further provisions of the
regulations substantiate an affirmative answer. Article 25 continues:
". . . Where a portion of the premiums or other consideration was actually paid by another and the remaining portion by the
decedent, either directly or indirectly, such insurance is considered
to have been taken out by the latter in the proportion that the payments therefor made by him bear to the total amount paid for the
insurance." 14
Article 2 7 provides for inclusion of proceeds over $40,000
"(1) To the extent to which such insurance was taken out by
the decedent upon his own life ( see article 2 5) after January IO,
1941, the date of Treasury Decision 5032, and
11 See Griswold, "A Summary of the Regulations Problem," 54 HARV. L. REV.
398 (1941).
12 T. D. 5032, 1941:1 CuM. BULL. 427, TREAS. REG. 105 (1942), § 81.25.
13 TREAs. REG. 80 (1937 ed.), art. 25.
a T. D. 5032, 1941 :1 CuM. BULL. 427, TREAS. REG. 105 (1942), § 81.25.
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"(2) To the extent to which such insurance was taken out by
the decedent upon his own life ( see article 2 5) on or before
January 10, 1941, and with respect to which the decedent possessed any of the legal incidents of ownership at any time after
such date or, in the case of a decedent dying on or before such
date, at the time of his death." 15
The implication of these provisions is that the commissioner now
considers retention of legal incidents of ownership to be relevant only
in determining whether or not premiums paid by decedent before
January 10, 1941, are to be taken into account in fixing the proportion
of the proceeds attributable to payments by decedent.
For two reasons it is surprising that the commissioner should abandon ownership of the policy as a positive basis for inclusion, rather than
preserving it as an alternative to the payment of premium basis. First,
such action opens up a new loophole for tax avoidance. For instance, if
a wife applied for a policy on her own life, retaining incidents of ownership in herself, the proceeds would not be taxable either to her estate
or to that of her husband if he paid all the premiums. It would not be
taxable to the husband's estate since he did not "take out" the policy
on his own life. It would not be taxable to the wife's estate since, under
T. D. 5032, she did not "take out" the policy at all. If the retention
of legal incidents of ownership had been retained as a basis for tax,
clearly the proceeds would be taxable to the wife's estate. Second, in
the case where the insured decedent possessed legal incidents at his
death but another has paid part of the premiums, part of the proceeds
are not included in decedent's estate under the present formula of the
regulations whereas they could all be taxed on the basis of ownership in
the decedent.
There would be no inconsistency in the maintenance of such a dual
basis of taxability. The Court of Claims suggested such action in the
Bailey case when on the third hearing 16 it decided that a possibility of
reverter in the insured decedent was grounds for taxation, although
failure of insured to continue premium payments after assigning the
policy was held on the second hearing 17 to exclude taxability under the
payment of premiums theory.
In addition, a sled-length adoption of the payment of premiums
theory as the sole test of taxability constitutes a fundamental departure
from the basic theory of estate taxation. In determining whether other
property is includable in decedent's gross estate, one does not ask, "Did he
pay for it?" for this is regarded as irrelevant. Rather it is asked, "Did he
ld., § 81.27.
(Ct. Cl. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 778.
17
(Ct. Cl. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 184.
15

111
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own it when he died?" While the payment of premiums theory is a
convenient and possibly justifiable device for the prevention of tax
avoidance, it seems that it should be confined to effectuating this purpose and not utilized so as to constitute a basic change in the approach
to estate taxation.
.__
The possible reluctance of the courts to give up ownership as a
basis for taxability is indicated by a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 18 under the regulations in force prior to I930. Such regulations,
like the present ones, declared the payment of premiums to be the test
for "taking out"; they provided "the insurance is not deemed to be
taken out by the decedent, even though the application is made by him,
where all the premiums are actually paid by the beneficiary." 19 The
board held that insurance applied for by the wife on her own life payable to her estate in which she retained incidents of ownership was taxable to her estate although her husband paid all the premiums. Expressly reserving its opinion as to the correctness of the regulations'
interpretation of the statute, the board reconciled its decision with these
regulations on the technical ground that in the case before it the
premiums were not paid by the beneficiary. 20
The effect of the "January IO, I94I" clauses may best be summed
up by the following fact situations: (I) where after January IO, I94I,
decedent possessed no legal incidents but did pay premiums, only the
proportion of the proceeds attributable to such premiums as are paid
by decedent after January IO are includable in his gross estate; (2)
where decedent possessed legal incidents after January IO, premiums
paid by decedent at any time are considered in determining the taxable
portion of the insurance, regardless of whether decedent assigns the
legal incidents before death; (3) where decedent died before January
IO possessing no legal incidents, no part of the proceeds is taxed; (4)
where decident died before January IO possessing some legal incidents,
the premiums paid by decedent determine the amount to be taxed. As
John Bromley, Exr., 16 B. T. A. 1322 (1929).
TREAS. REG. 68 (1924 ed.), art. 25.
20 It will be noted that, in referring to the situation where decedent will not be
deemed to have taken out the policy, the regulations as amended by T. D. 5032 do
not use the phrase of TREAS. REG. 68 and 70 "where all the premiums are actually
paid by the beneficiary" but state that insurance is not included in the estate "if no
part of the premiums or other consideration was paid either directly or indirectly by"
the decedent. If this change was a studied one, it might well have been intended to
remove the above possibility of taxing proceeds where decedent has not paid premiums.
On the other hand, although the present regulations provide, "Such insurance is not
considered to have been so taken out, even tkougk tke application war made by the
decedent," if he paid no part of the premiums, there is not added ,the words " and
eoen tkougk he porre;red legal incident; of ownerrhip therein.". Such a qualification
might very well have been inserted in view of the language of previous regulations.
18

19
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previously noted, the reason for introducing this dividing line date,
January ro, r94r, was to give effect to the well-established policy of
not applying new interpretative regulations retroactively.21
It remains to be considered whether the regulations as now amended,
embodying the idea of taxability on the basis of payment of premiums,
are constitutional. As a general rule when a man transfers property
during his lifetime, it is cJ_early arbitrary under the Fifth Amendment
to classify and tax such transfer as one at death. 22 If he retains no strings
or control, nothing is transferred from decedent at his death and no
control expires in decedent so as to give others greater rights, which
might constitute a taxable event. While it is true that the beneficiaries
cannot realize full .enjoyment of the proceeds until his death, this fact
alone will not support taxability. 23 Where decedent applies for insurance on his own life, pays premiums, and retains incidents of ownership
for a substantial period of time and then, after January ro, r 941,
assigns the policy with all incidents of ownership to his wife ( without
condition of survivorship), but continues to make all premium payments until his death, no taxable incident seems to be createc;I. by the
death of decedent. No interest in the policy passes at his death. The
additional factor of decedent's continued payment of premiums after
assignment is nothing more than a series of inter vivos gifts. 24
There are, however, certain arguments which can be made in favor
of constitutionality.25 Life insurance is inherently testamentary in nature
-a substitute for testamentary disposition. When a man transfers
ownership in a policy during his life, he does not dispose of all the benefits of the policy. At most the transferee has rights to the cash surrender value of the policy. Before the face value of the policy can be
enjoyed by anyone, the remaining premiums must be paid and the insured must die. Thus upon decedent's death, two previously nonexistent "rights" or benefits come into being-the cessation of obligation to make premium payments, and the right to the full enjoyment
of the face value of the policy. This "springing up" of previously nonexistent property rights, coupled with the termination of the obligation
to pay premiums, constitute the constitutionally required taxable event.
Such enlargement of the beneficiary's rights without any shift of bene21

See Griswold, "A Summary of the Regulations Problem," 54 HARV. L. REv.

398 at 404 (1941).
22 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927); Oppenheimer,
''Proceeds of Life Insurance Policies under the Federal Estate Tax," 43 HARV. L.
REv. 724 at 730-734 (1930).
'
28 Shukert v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545, 47 S. Ct. 461 (1927).
24 They are so treated by the commissioner under the gift tax. TREAS. REG. 79
(1936 ed.), art. 2 (6).
25 See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G1FT TAXATION 523-527 (1942).
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fits from the estate has been held taxable to the decedent's estate in
cases of joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety. 26
Under careful scrutiny these contentions supporting constitutionality lose much of their force. Life insurance is testamentary in the
sense that full enjoyment is postponed until death, but to no greater
extent than an absolute trust to accumulate income until the death of the
settlor and then distribute to the beneficiary or an absolute gift in escrow
with possession postponed until the death of the donor. In neither of these
cases could the property so disposed of before death be constitutionally
included in the settlor's or donor's estate for tax purposes.21 It has been
well settled that the mere fixing of decedent's death as the time for
transfer of possession does not create a taxable event to decedent's
estate.28 The unique and mystical concept of "springing up" of previously nonexistent property seems, in the last analysis, to be nothing
more than the performance at the stated time of an executory contract.
Whatever new rights arise in the beneficiary at the time of decedent's
death clearly do not pass from the decedent.
There are two very material distinctions between the case of a joint
tenancy and the case at hand which deprive the analogy of any supporting force. First, in the case of joint tenancies, until death the decedent
has a very real and material interest in the half owned by the survivor
-that is, the possibility of acquiring the entire ownership of such half
by the prior death of the co-tenant. Such interest is comparable to, and
at least the equivalent in magnitude of, a possibility of reverter upon
the condition subsequent of nonsurvivorship. Such an interest in the
property of an assignee of an insurance policy is entirely lacking when
the assignment is without condition of survivorship. Second, in the
case of joint tenants, the decedent has not done everything possible to
divest himself of all interest in the fractional ownership of the survivor. He might effect a partition of the land, or change the joint tenancy to a tenancy in common. Either of these courses would result in
nontaxability of the survivor's interest to decedent's estate.29 But where
there is an assignment of an insurance policy, the decedent has done
everything possible to divest himself of all interest and control in the
policy.
Perhaps the strongest reason for taxability is that the continued pay26 Tyler v. United States, 28 I U. S. 497, 50 S. Ct. 3 56 ( 1930); United States
v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939).
2 '! I PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GrFT TAXATION, c. 7 (1942).
28 Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 47 S. Ct. 461 (1927); Ray, "The Estate
Tax on Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoyment at or after
Death: Helvering v. Hallock," :z.9 GEo. L. J. 943 (1941).
29 See I PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G1FT TAXATION, § 8.07 (1942); Estate
of L. L. Fletcher, 44 B. T. A. 429 ( 1941).
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ment of premiums by decedent after assignment of the policy negatives
any plausible reason for the transfer other than to avoid the estate tax.
Since courts have had no trouble in sustaining the estate taxation of
property transferred by inter vivos gift in contemplation of death to
prevent tax avoidance, they might on like grounds sustain the estate
tax as applied to the facts under consideration.
Where the insured decedent not only lacked incidents of ownership at his death, but also discontinued paying the premiums before
his death, so it is even more difficult to find a taxable incident. The only
basis for including that portion of the policy corresponding to the
amount of premiums the decedent paid is to prevent tax avoidance.
But here there would seem to be reasons other than tax avoidance for
the decedent to assign the policy and stop paying· premiums. For instance, he may assign to the beneficiary for the purpose of relieving
himself of the burden of keeping up the policy. On the tax avoidance
question a logical and reasonable line might well be drawn between
those cases where decedent pays premiums until his death ( or ceases
payment in contemplation of death) and those cases where he does
not continue to make payments. Such distinction was laid down by the
second decision of the Bailey case 31 and may reasonably be expected to
be drawn by the courts in passing on the validity of the present regulations.
Stated briefly, the effect of T. D. 5032 has thus been to revert to
the original test of payment of premiums for determining when insurance has been "taken out" by the decedent, and to abandon ownership of the policy as a basis for including the proceeds in decedent's
estate, thereby departing from the fundamental theory of estate taxation. Thus the regulations, in closing one door to tax avoidance, apparently open another. While this avenue of escape may be narrowed
by judicial interpretation, a change in the regulations probably will be
required to seal it completely.
Lloyd M. Forster

80 The facts considered in the second hearing of the Bailey case, Bailey v. United
States, (Ct. CI. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 184.
3 1. Id.

